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Abstract
My article is concerned with the conflict in laws between freedom
of religion and law of apostasy within the broader Malaysian
constitutional framework. The issue is controversial because, while
freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Malaysian Constitution,
some respective states in Malaysia have treated Muslims who intend
to leave the Islamic faith as criminals. Even though there is no death
penalty for apostasy in Malaysia, apostates shall be detained, fined
or punishable with imprisonment up to three years. Such punishments
seem contrary to the provision of Article 11(1) of the Federal
Constitution which guarantees the right of freedom of religion. It
also deprived individual liberty as provided in Article 5(1) of the
Federal Constitution. Moreover, these punishments also seem
contrary to Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution that maintains
the supremacy of the Constitution, and Article 75 that upholds the
Federal law powers in the event where State law is inconsistent with
the Federal law.
This article seeks to study in depth the notion of the right of
freedom of religion and the question of apostasy from the Malaysian
laws perspective. In doing so, this article will investigate whether
Muslims are given the right to leave the Islamic faith and to choose
and profess any religion they wish as guaranteed under Article 11(1)
of the Federal Constitution. This article will also highlight the
problems surrounding the provisions in relation to law of apostasy
in Malaysia. This article attempts to suggest that Muslims who intend
to leave the Islamic faith are required to undergo a process of tauba
(repentance) and this usually takes place at the counselling session.
This article also suggests that any law introduced to restrict the
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right to freedom of religion is contrary to the Malaysian Constitution,
being the supreme law of the country, and may seem as infringement
of human rights in the eyes of the International law particularly
under Articles 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 (UDHR of 1948) and the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR of 1966) respectively.
Introduction
Malaysia is a nation of ethnic and religious pluralism. The total population
of Malaysia, according to 2000 Census, is 23.27 million1. Almost half are
Malays (11.7 million or 49.7%) who usually embrace the religion of Islam
though there are also Muslims of Indian and Chinese descent. Based on
ethnic composition, the Bumiputera (natural soil people - Malays and
indigenous Sabah and Sarawak inhabitants) comprised 65.1%, Chinese
26%, Indians 7.7%, and other ethnic minorities 2.2%. As far as religion
is concerned, these are 60.4% Muslims. Malaysia, being a religious such
as Buddhism (19.2%), Christianity (9.1%) and Hinduism (6.3%),
Confucianism/Taoism/other traditional Chinese religion (2.6%), while
Sikhism and other beliefs form the remainders (2.4%).2
In ensuring that all citizens live in peace and harmony, the Federal
Constitution has assured religious freedom to every person, Muslims
and non-Muslims alike. Article 3 (1) of the Federal Constitution states
that although Islam is the religion of the Federation, other religions are
given a freedom of practice provided they must be conform to peace
and harmony. Article 11(1) provides that every person has the right to
profess and practise his religion except in propagation. Non-Muslim are
prohibited to propagate their religion among Muslims. However,
propagation among non-Muslims faces not obstacles.
Religious Freedom in the Sphere of International
Conventions
The right of freedom of religion has been a universal right. The international
body, the United Nations (UN), had endorsed a declaration notably, the
United Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 (UDHR of 1948). With
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regard to the right of freedom of religion, the UDHR of 1948 through
Article 18 states that:
"Everybody has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance".
In the initial stage of debate at the UN, the Saudi's representative
objected to this particular provision, condemning that such provision that
gives the right to change one's religion is not recognised in Islamic law.3
When the Declaration came before the General Assembly for a final
vote, Pakistan's representative made a very interesting statement on the
issue of religious liberty saying that Islam unequivocally endorsed freedom
of conscience.4 In the end, when it came to the voting session, Saudi
Arabia was alone among the Muslim countries in abstaining, joined only
by South Africa and various East Bloc countries.5 It is worth to note that
the phrase guaranteeing the right to change religion was added to the
UDHR at the specific request by the Lebanese delegation (who is a
Christian by religion).6 Later in a surprise ever stand taken by the Muslim
countries, the 1972 Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Countries
(OIC), the international body to which every Muslim country belong,
declared that the provisions on human rights as promulgated by the
international law were in accordance with the Islamic values.7
The provision on right of freedom of religion has also been emphasised
in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966 (ICCPR of 1966) which notes:
(1) "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching";
(2) "No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice".
Even though Malaysia is a member of the United Nations, it has yet
to ratify both the UDHR of 1948 and the ICCPR of 1966. The
establishment of the Commission of Human Rights of Malaysia
(SUHAKAM) in 1999 is seen by many human rights activists as a
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milestone towards accepting the international conventions. Despite the
fact that SUHAKAM is an advisory body which has no power of
enforcement, its annual report to the Parliament has to some extent
remains important. Any infringement of human rights including matters
relating to freedom of religion would be taken into the government
concerns.
The Scope of Freedom of Religion in Malaysia
One of the fundamental liberties enshrined in the Federal Constitution is
the right of freedom of religion. Article 3 (1) of the Federal Constitution
states that although Islam is the religion of the Federation, other religions
are given a freedom to practise provided that they must be conformed in
peace and harmony. The right of religious freedom has been reiterated
in Article 11(1). It provides that every person has the right to profess
and practise his religion. Every person has also the right to propagate his
religion, but state law, and in respect of the Federal Territory, Federal
law may control or restrict the propagation of any religion, doctrine or
belief among person professing the Muslim religion. Thus, according to
Professor Andrew Harding, "Article 11, while safeguarding freedom of
religion, draws a distinction between practice and propagation of
religion".8 It seems that non-Muslims are given more religious practice
rather than propagation. By virtue of Article 11(4), the State legislation
has a jurisdiction to enact legislation in controlling and restricting the
propagation of non-Islamic religious doctrines and beliefs among persons
professing the religion of Islam. Hence, it is strictly prohibited for members
of other religions to proselytise Muslims, but in contrast, proselytising of
non-Muslims faces no obstacle. Accordingly, the government through
its Non-Islamic Religions (Control of Propagation Amongst Muslim
Enactments) in various States can prosecute such action.9 This means
that religious freedom in Malaysia is not precisely equal. However, one
of the main reasons such provision has been included in the Federal
Constitutions is to maintain social stability.10
One of the provisions that gives inequality of religious freedom
particularly on proselytising of Muslims is that the special provision given
to the religion of Islam as enshrined under Article 3(1) of the Federal
Constitution. It seems that Article 3(1) appears to some extent to reaffirm
the supremacy of the position of Islam under the Federal Constitution.
And because Malay and Islamic religion cannot be separated, one could
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not argue the privileges and rights of Malays, especially with regard to
religion. This could be seen in relation to financial assistance for the
development of the Islamic religion. Article 12(2) of the Federal
Constitution legalises the Government to spend an enormous amount of
money for such purposes.
In Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v Fatimah bte Sihi & Anor,11
despite being a High Court decision, the learned judge held that "Islam in
the Constitution means al-deen, a complete way of life and not just a
mere set of rituals which is concerned with the relationship between
man and his creator".12 It is interesting to note that learned judge also
held that "Islam is the primary religion which takes precedence over
other religions in Malaysia, and this is the implication of the stipulation of
Islam as the religion of the Federation".13
However, such interpretation was otherwise decided in Che Omar
bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor,1* where Tun Salleh Abbas (as he
was then) stated that "although there can be no doubt that Islam is not
just a mere collection of dogmas and rituals but it is a complete way of
life covering all fields of human activities, may they be private or public,
legal, political, economic, social, cultural, moral or judicial", the provision
of Article 3(1) merely provided for a ritualistic and ceremonial role of
Islam, not beyond that.15
It must also be noted that Article 160 defines 'Malay' as a person
who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language
and conforms to Malay customs. In one particular case, Lina Joy v
Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor,16 the learned judge
said that "a person as long as he/she is a Malay and by definition under
Article 160(2) a Malay, the said person cannot renounce his/her religion
at all. A Malay under Article 160(2) remains in the Islamic faith until his
or her dying days".
The provision of religious freedom enshrined in Article 11 (1) is not
absolute. Even though every individual has a freedom to profess, practise
and propagate a religion, this right is subject to certain restrictions. Thus,
Article 11(5) of the Federal Constitution states: "This Article does not
authorise any act contrary to any general law relating to public order,
public health or morality". Moreover, Article 10(2) (a) states that:
"Parliament may by law impose on rights conferred by paragraph
(a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any
part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order
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or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of
Parliament or any Legislative Assembly or to provide against
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence".
However, restrictions on religious freedom, though introduced in the
name of Parliament, cannot be passed, in respect to Articles 149
(legislation against subversion, action prejudicial to public order, etc.)
and 150 (proclamation of emergency) of the Federal Constitutions.
Some Leading Cases in Relation to Freedom of
Religion
Given the above discussion on the scope and provisions over freedom of
religion under the Federal Constitution, it is essential to discuss the court
interpretation on the issue. There are at least six leading reported cases
that deal with the right of freedom of religion. Starting with Susie Teoh11
in 1986, Jamaluddin Othmanli in 1989 and Meor Atiqulrahman19 in
2000, where the Courts seemed to give judgement in favour to the notion
of freedom of religion. The Courts, however, ruled that the right of freedom
of religion was not absolute after taking into consideration clause (5) of
Article 11 which provides religious freedom cannot be granted in the
event where it is contrary to public order. The cases of Hjh
Halimatussaadiah20 in 1994, Zakaria Abdul Rahman21 in 2001 and
Lina Joy12 in 2004 are among cases which indicate the denial of freedom
of religion.
In Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi of Pasir Mas Kelantan & Majlis
Ugama Islam Kelantan dan Adat Istiadat Melayu, Kelantan23 a
Chinese girl, Susie Teoh has converted to Islam, apparently of her own
free will at the age of 17 years and 8 months. Her father, as a guardian
has brought her up as a Buddhist. Her father sought a declaration that
he was entitled to decide her religion, since she was a minor during her
conversion to Islam, and that her conversion without his consent, was
void. The question of conversion was argued on the basis of Article 11
(1) of the Federal Constitution. In the High Court, the learned judge,
Justice Abdul Malek held that she had a right under Article 11 (1) of the
Federal Constitution to choose her own religion, and that her conversion
to Islam was of her free will. Thus, according to the learned judge, the
age of the person in this issue was irrelevant since she was of sound
mind and in the position to decide. Furthermore, the learned judge also
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applied the Islamic age of majority, and in this case she has experienced
menstruation. The father appealed to the Supreme Court (as it then
was), and the Court overturned the decision of the High Court, saying
that "as the law applicable to the infant at the time of conversion was the
civil law, the right to practice of a person under 18 years of age should
be decided by her parent or guardian".24 Consequently, under the Civil
law the child conversion to Islam was invalid. However, since she was
already above 18 years old at the time of the appeal, she was not bound
to listen to her father in choosing her religion.25
In Minister of Home Affairs & Anor v Jamaluddin bin Othman,26
the Supreme Court (as it then was) held that the detention of the
respondent under section 8(1) of the Internal Security Act (ISA) of
1960 was invalid. The ground of his detention was solely due to his
involvement of disseminating the religion of Christianity among Malays,
and that he had successfully converted six Malays to Christianity. The
Court held that such grounds cannot be regarded as a threat to the security
of the country, and the respondent had such right under the right of
religious freedom enshrined under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution.
It seems that the ground judgement of Jamaluddin's case is an
attempt by the Supreme Court (as it then was) to correct the blunder
made by the executive, namely the Minister of Home Affairs over the
provision of religious right. By virtue of Article 11(1) of the Federal
Constitution, such right cannot be overridden by other federal law, namely
the ISA.
Perhaps Jamaluddin's case cannot be regarded as a good example
on the question of propagation. In a first case ever charged under the
Pahang Non-Islamic Religions (Control of Propagation Amongst Muslim)
Enactment of 1989, PP v Krishnan s/o Muthu,21 the accused was
sentenced to 20 days imprisonment and fine of RM1500 on the ground
of forcing a Muslim woman to convert to Hinduism. It was understood
that the victim had fallen in love with the accused, who was married at
that time. Because the victim had no place to live, the accused gave
permission for her to live at his house together with his wife. During her
stay at the accused house, there were series of quarrels, which
subsequently resulted in an assault. The victim was also forced to convert
to Hinduism. She was also not given a chance to perform prayers.
In Hjh Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, Malaysia
& Anor2% a female public servant was dismissed from the service for
insisting on putting & purdah (veil) in defiance of a government circular
that forbidding its wearing. In her application to the High Court, she
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argued, inter alia, that her dismissal was unlawful and unconstitutional
based on Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. She lost her case and
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court (as it then was). She argued
that it was her incumbent to wear the purdah and that circular violated
her constitutional rights conferred under Article 11 of the Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision based
on the legality of the circular even though it seemed that the circular, to
some extent, has restricted and limited individual freedom of religion.
The Supreme Court, also, after considering afatwa issued by the Mufti
of Federal Territory, ruled out that such act was neither recommended
nor obligatory upon Muslim women. It appears that the Supreme Court
accepted the Public Service Department's circular because it was for
the benefit of public order. Furthermore, the dismissal of the appellant
from office simply indicates that the right to practise one's religion is
subject to the Constitution, and in this case Article 11(5). However, the
judgement has been criticised by many, including Prof. Aziz Bari and a
prominent lawyer, Zainur Zakaria, arguing that how wearing a veil could
be held contravening public order since she had been putting it on for
several years without any incident of such nature. Indeed, the issue
whether wearing a veil was incumbent or not was not the subject
concerned since Islam did not prohibit from wearing it.29
In Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak & Anor. v Fatimah Bte Sihi &
Anor,30 three pupils were expelled from school after ignoring the order
issued by the headteacher (the first defendant). The headteacher had
apparently asked the pupils to remove their serban (turbans) and
substituted it with songkok (black hat). The Seremban High Court,
however, ruled that the dismissal was void, invalid and ineffective, and
the pupils should have been resumed back to the same school. In the
judgement, the learned judge ruled that wearing a turban is accepted in
Islam though it is not obligatory. It was also in line within the provision of
Article 11(1) that guarantees individual in professing and practicing his
religion. To prohibit such act would be regarded as contrary to Articles
3(1) and 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, such prohibition
has nothing to do with general law that relates to public order, public
health and morality. Referring to the case of Halimatussaadiah, the
learned judge had also made a distinction between wearing a turban and
veil. The learned judge ruled that while putting a veil while working
would make it difficult to identify the staff concerned and may lead to
breach of public security, the same could not be said about wearing a
turban.31 However, the Court of Appeal overruled the High Court
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judgement merely on the ground that the headteacher was right to dismiss
the pupils from the school because they did not conform to the school
regulations. The issue of the right to freedom of religion, according to
the Court did not arise at all.32 The judgement has been widely criticised
by human rights activists and opposition parties, particularly by PAS.
They claimed that such ruling seemed similar to the one happened in
France where Muslim girls were forbidden to wear veil at schools.33 It is
reported that the father of the pupils had applied for an appeal to the
Federal Court.34
In Zakaria Abdul Rahman v Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia,35
the plaintiff was dismissed from office as Chief Inspector by the
Inspector-General of Police, the defendant in this case. The problems
began when the plaintiff applied for a permission to marry a second
wife. His application, however, was rejected and the defendant had
strongly advised him to end the relationship with the woman or face a
disciplinary action. The plaintiff, apparently, ignored the warning and
continued his intimate relationship with her. As a result of this, he was
charged with the offence of failing to abide an order by his superior
office. The plaintiff accepted the decision of the disciplinary authority as
well as the punishment imposed on him. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
continued with the relationship which proceeded to marry the woman.
Thus, this had led to further disciplinary proceedings. The defendant
later expelled him from the service on two grounds, that (a) the plaintiff
had breached the order of the disciplinary board by having an intimate
relationship with the same women; and (b) that the conduct of the plaintiff
had brought to disrepute to the public services.36
The plaintiff argued that (a) the second disciplinary proceeding was
based on the same facts as the first proceeding - for which he had
already been charged, found guilty and punished - and thus the subsequent
proceeding was unconstitutional since it went against Article 7(2) of the
Federal Constitution which prohibited double jeopardy,37 (b) the charge
was unsustainable as it was contrary to the plaintiff's right to freedom of
religion under Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution, and (c) that the
sentence imposed by the defendant was excessive.38
In his judgement, the learned judge upheld the application by the
plaintiff. The learned judge held that the order of dismissal made against
the plaintiff was wrong and must be set aside on the ground that he was
virtually put before two disciplinary proceedings which based on the
same facts - which seem akin to double jeopardy.
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With regard to the second ground advanced by the plaintiff, the learned
judge ruled that since polygamous marriage was merely permissible and
not obligatory, the plaintiff could not argue that by imposing a condition
before a member of the police force could marry the second wife would
amount to denying him the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution.39
In Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor,40
the plaintiff was a Muslim by birth. Her parents were also Muslims by
birth. They were all Malays. She was brought up by her Muslim parents
and practised the religion of Islam until she applied to change her name
from Azlina Bte Jailani to Lina Lelani at the National Registration
Department. In her supporting documents, inter alia, that she intends to
marry a person who is Christian. The application was however, rejected.
The plaintiff applied to the High Court for various declaratory orders,
among others: (1) That her rights to religious freedom under Article
11(1) of the Federal Constitution are rightly guaranteed; and (2) That
any laws, whether State or Federal Legislation, which forbid or imposed
restrictions on conversion out of Islam, were null and void, being consistent
with Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution.
The learned judge, however, dismissed the application on the ground
that Article 11(1) did not mean that the plaintiff was given a total freedom
of choice to profess and practise the religion of her choice. This was
because the expression that everybody has the right to profess and
practise his religion, is subject to second part of Article 11(1), and also to
Articles 11(4) and 11(5). The learned judge also held that the plaintiff
cannot hide behind the provision of Article 11(1) of the Federal
Constitution without first settling the issue of renunciation of her religion
(Islam) with the religious authority which has the right to manage its
own religious affairs under Article 11(3) (a) of the Federal Constitution.
Since the plaintiff was still a Muslim at the time of the application, by
virtue of Article 121(1 A) of the Federal Constitution, the only competent
court to declare her apostasy was within the Shari 'a Courts. And because
such declaration has not been decided by any of the Shari 'a Courts, the
plaintiff was still regarded as a Muslim.
Restriction of Conversion Out of Islam
Although Article 11(1) provides individual a freedom in professing and
practising his/her religion, such freedom does not seem fully awarded to
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Muslims. Muslims who tend to renounce Islam are subject to certain
restrictions which include imprisonment, fine, whipping, or mandatory
detention. Such restrictions have brought into debate, whether those
punishments and detention are considered as infringements of the right
of freedom of religion stipulated under fundamental liberty, which is
guaranteed under the Federal Constitution. The question of
constitutionality of such laws is also aroused.
Punishment for Apostasy
There are at least five states in Malaysia that have incorporated the
punishment for apostasy either in the Islamic Criminal Law Enactments
or the Administration of Islamic Law Enactments. These provisions could
be identified in the states of:
a. Pahang
In a decisive provision on apostasy, Pahang has made apostasy as an
offence in its Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay
Custom Enactment of 1982 (Amended 1989). Section 185 provides "Any
Muslim who states that he has ceased to be a Muslim, whether orally, in
writing or in any other manner whatsoever, with any intent whatsoever,
commits an offence, and on conviction shall be liable to a fine not
exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years or to both and to whipping of not more that six
strokes".
b. Perak
The State of Perak has also made apostasy as an offence in its Islamic
Criminal Law. Section 13 of the Perak Islamic Criminal Law Enactment
of 1992 provides "Any Muslim who by his word or conduct whatsoever
intentionally claims to cease to profess the religion of Islam or declares
himself to be non-Muslim, shall be considered as insulting the religion of
Islam, and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding three
thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years
or both".41
c. Melaka
Like Pahang and Perak, Melaka has also incorporated the punishment
of apostasy in its enactment. Section 209 (1) of the Melaka Administration
of Islamic Law Enactment of 1986 provides a provision on insulting the
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religion of Islam as an offence. Any Muslim convicted to this offence
shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both. Under
section 209(2), the Enactment reiterates that Muslim who declares himself
to be out of the religion of Islam, shall also be regarded insulting the
religion of Islam, and upon conviction is subject to a fine and imprisonment
as provided under clause (1).
d. Sabah
Unlike Sarawak, Sabah is the only Borneo state that declares apostasy
as an offence under its Islamic Criminal Law Enactment of 1995. Section
55(1) states "whoever by words spoken or written or by visible
representation or in any other manner which insults or brings into contempt
or ridicule the religion of Islam or the tenets of any lawful school or any
lawfully appointed religious officer, religious teacher, Imam, any lawfully
issued fatwa by the Majlis or the Mufti under the provisions of any law
or this Enactment shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction,
be liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand ringgit or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year or both".
Section 55(2) reiterates "A Muslim who claims that he is not a Muslim
shall be guilty of an offence under subsection (1) and shall, on conviction,
be liable to the punishment thereof provided".
e. Terengganu
It seems that Terengganu also follows the same step in introducing
punishment on apostasy. Section 29 of the Terengganu Administration
of Islamic Law Enactment of 1996 provides "Any Muslim who attempts
to renounce the religion of Islam or declares himself to be non-Muslim,
shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both".
Mandatory Detention at the Rehabilitation Centre
Apart of provisions on punishment for apostasy, there are also some
states that provide detention for Muslims who tend to renounce Islam.
This is because the respective state enactments require the persons to
be rehabilitated and educated for the purpose of repentance. The general
approach taken by state like Melaka is that, if a Muslim admits that he
has left the religion of Islam or declares himself a non-Muslim, and the
Court is satisfied that he has indeed done something that can be interpreted
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as an attempt to change his religion, the court should order him to be
detained at the Islamic rehabilitation centre for a period not exceeding
six months. During the period of rehabilitation, he will be required to
undergo a course of education and asked to repent.42 During this period
also, the officer in charge is required to send a weekly progress report to
the court.43 If the detainee repents and the court is satisfied about the
repentance, he will then be released.44 Other states like Kelantan and
Sabah appear to provide the same provisions except that the period of
detention has been increased to up to 36 months.45
It must be noted that the Federal Government had proposed a Bill on
apostasy but it never reached the Parliament. The Bill was mainly provided
for rehabilitation. Muslim who tends or declares himself converting out
of Islam shall be brought before a Shari 'a High Court. The judge should
advice such person to repent, and if he does so, the judge will then order
his release. However, if he refuses to do so, the judge will order him to
be detained at the rehabilitation centre for a period not exceeding 30
days. The main reason behind the detention is to persuade and educate
the person so that he repents and return to the faith of Islam. If he
refuses to repent after the stated period, he will be brought back before
the judge, and the judge after satisfied that he has no liability and obligation
under the Islamic Family Law will make a declaration that he is no
longer a Muslim and order his release. No imprisonment and fine
punishments are prescribed upon him. The Bill was criticised by many
Non-Governmental Organisations, particularly on the provision of
detention at the rehabilitation centre. It seems that Muslims who tend to
renounce from the Islamic religion are detained as they were committed
an offence, whereas, in reality they only want to seek a conversion out
of Islam. Having mandatory detention even for the sake of repentance
could lead to infringement of individual liberty enshrined under Article
5(1) of the Federal Constitution.
In the midst of debates and criticisms over the question of freedom
of religion and punishment for apostasy, perhaps due to Nor'aisyah
Bokahri's case,46 in March 2000, it was revealed that the State of Selangor,
which was dominantly ruled by the UMNO-BN (United Malay National
Organisation - Barisan Nasional) published an 'Aqida Protection (State
of Selangor) Bill 2000 for general information with a hope to table it at
the Selangor Legislative Assembly. The Bill did not reach the Assembly
at all. At one of the meetings of the State leaders, it was revealed that
representatives by Gerakan Party (Malaysian Peoples Movement Party)
and MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association), which represent non-Malays
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but mainly Chinese community, had voiced their concerns with regard to
the Bill, particularly over the questions of detention. According to them,
Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees the liberty of the
person, which states "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty save in accordance with law". Since detention at the rehabilitation
centre is regarded a mandatory detention, it could be argued that this
provision is unconstitutional and void. Moreover, such detention seems
to contradictory with another provision under Article 11(1) of the Federal
Constitution that guarantees the right of religious freedom, though there
is no provision in this article that clearly stated that religious freedom
shall mean changing a religion. However, they seemed to agree that a
series of counselling could be an alternative rather than mandatory
detention, instead.47
In the midst of debate on the Selangor 'Aqida Protection Bill, the
State of Perlis which was also under the UMNO-BN controlled,
announced that the government was planning to table a Bill known as
the Perlis Islamic Aqida Bill, 2000. The Bill, according to Harun Hashim,
a former Supreme Court Judge, was based and modelled on the Federal
Rang Undang-undang Pemulihan 'Aqidah (Islamic Faith Protection
Bill) that he himself helped to draft.48 Most of the provisions seemed to
imitate the Federal and Selangor Bills. However, a deep scrutiny reveals
that some of the provisions have been modified to suit the Perlis's State
Government. One of the instances is the period of rehabilitation.
According to the Perlis Bill, the maximum period of detention at the
Rehabilitation Centre is one year, whereas the Federal Bill provides a
detention up to 30 days.49 In a surprising development, the Bill was passed
by the UMNO-BN members of State Legislative Assembly. Only two
members of the Assembly mainly representing PAS (the Islamic Party),
opposed the Bill, arguing that the Bill did not reach the standard of Islamic
Criminal Law or the Hudud Laws. After receiving many objections and
memorandums from various organisations, the Federal Government
ordered the State of Perlis to withdraw the Bill, and until now, there is no
further development as far as the law of apostasy in Perlis is concerned.50
Non-Uniformity of Apostasy Laws
Because Islamic law has been confined under the respective states,
there are various Islamic Criminal Laws in Malaysia. This, in certain
aspects has brought to non-uniformity of laws, particularly in the area of
apostasy laws. The provisions on apostasy differ from one state to another.
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From the five states that provide a physical and monetary punishment,
the state of Pahang seems to provide the most deterrent one. It states
that any Muslim who ceases to be a Muslim shall be liable to a fine not
exceeding RM5000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
years or to both and to whipping of not more than six strokes.51 Perak,
Terengganu and Melaka provide a punishment of a fine not exceeding
RM3000.52 Sabah, however prescribes a fine not exceeding RM2000.53
As for punishment of imprisonment, Perak provides a period not
exceeding two years.54 However, Terengganu, Melaka and Sabah
prescribe a period not exceeding one year's imprisonment.55 This seems
unfair as different types of punishments are meted out for the same
offence.
There are at least three states that provide detention for Muslims
who tend to renounce Islam. A judge of the Shari'a Court after being
satisfied that a Muslim has indeed done something that could be regarded
as an attempt to leave the Islamic faith, orders him to be detained at the
Islamic Faith Rehabilitation Centre. However, the duration of detention
varies from one state to another. The states of Kelantan and Sabah
appear to fix a period up to three years detention. Melaka seems to
provide a shorter period that is up to six months. The different period of
detention for rehabilitation also seems in the eyes of law, infringing human
rights and denies justice. There should be a standard and uniform period
of rehabilitation in the entire nation, should this procedure be applied in
Malaysia.
Negeri Sembilan is the only state that provides facilitation for Muslims
who wish to convert out of Islam. Because the majority of apostasy
cases are those of Muslim converts, this state allows Muslims to renounce
Islam through a declaration at the Shari 'a Court, and this has to some
extent, solve the problem of murtad (apostate) status. The provision in
Negeri Sembilan that allows Muslim to apply for renunciation of Islam
should be introduced in the entire states in Malaysia. What the provision
provides is that at any time a Muslim intends to renounce Islam shall
apply to the Shari'a Court, and after the Shari'a Court received such
an application, it shall refer the case to the Mufti. The applicant will then
have counselling and education sessions for repentance purposes for 30
days. If the applicant repents at any time during the given period, the
officer in-charge shall make a report to the Shari'a Court, and the case
will be dismissed. However, if he refuses to repent upon the expiry date,
the Shari 'a Court will make a declaration that he is no longer a Muslim,
and register him in the New Converts' Registration records.56 Because
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of the "lenient provision" on conversion out of Islam, many Muslims
particularly those who were not born Muslims have filed application in
Negeri Sembilan. For example, out of 89 applicants from 1994 till July
2003,16 applications have been approved, 29 rejected and 39 have been
postponed.57
Conclusion and Suggestion
My study has revealed that freedom of religion in Malaysia is not absolute.
Certain restrictions have been imposed on Muslims and non-Muslims
alike. These could be seen in Articles 11(4),58 11(5)59 and 10(2)60 of the
Federal Constitution. It seems that the punishment for apostasy as
provided in some states in Malaysia is contrary to the right of freedom
for religion enshrined in Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution.
Contention that suggests that punishment for apostasy is constitutionally
valid on the ground that the Federal Constitution allows the respective
States including the Federal Territory to introduce law of apostasy is
questionable. Although the Ninth Schedule - List II - State List of the
Federal Constitution awards the Islamic law jurisdiction to include
"creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion
of Islam against precepts of that religion", such provision cannot override
the right to freedom of religion stipulated under Article 11(1). Similarly,
detaining Muslims who intend to renounce the Islamic faith at the
rehabilitation centre appears contrary to the right stipulated in Article
5(1) of the Federal Constitution. Because the provision on the right to
freedom of religion is awarded to individual in Malaysia, Muslim, by
virtue of Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution has also the right to
change his religion. Any law introduced either by the State Legislations
or Parliament that restricts this fundamental right is regarded null, void
and unconstitutional.
It is suggested that punishment for apostasy in some respective states
should be amended. It is also suggested that provision on mandatory
detention at the rehabilitation centre for Muslims who intend to convert
out of Islam should be repealed, and should be substituted with a series
of counselling. The Negeri Sembilan's experience in handling apostasy
cases is the most suitable solution since it never denies the right of
Muslims to renounce the Islamic faith. This facilitation of process to
renounce Islam has been provided in its amendment of Section 90 of the
Administration Islamic Law of 1991 in 1995. Under this amendment, a
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Muslim who intends to convert out of Islam is given a 30 days period for
repentance during which he is under the supervision of the Mufti. If he
refuses to repent upon the expiry date, the judge will then make a
declaration that he is no longer a Muslim.
Such counselling process is indeed not a new one. The Republic of
Singapore through its Muslim law has provided a provision that a Muslim
who intends to renounce from the Islamic faith must first attend a
counselling at the State's Mufti Office. The law requires that an approval
to renounce from the Islamic faith must be issued by the Mufti. In this
respect, neither punishment nor mandatory detention is prescribed upon
apostates. Nonetheless, the process of counselling has resulted in the
positive results, where it is reported that almost 90% of Muslims who
underwent such process have returned to Islam.61
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